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Location Verification Systems Under Spatially
Correlated Shadowing
Shihao Yan, Ido Nevat, Gareth W. Peters, and Robert Malaney
Abstract—The verification of the location information utilized
in wireless communication networks is a subject of growing
importance. In this work we formally analyze, for the first time,
the performance of a wireless Location Verification System (LVS)
under the realistic setting of spatially correlated shadowing.
Our analysis illustrates that anticipated levels of correlated
shadowing can lead to a dramatic performance improvement of a
Received Signal Strength (RSS)-based LVS. We also analyze the
performance of an LVS that utilizes Differential Received Signal
Strength (DRSS), formally proving the rather counter-intuitive
result that a DRSS-based LVS has identical performance to that
of an RSS-based LVS, for all levels of correlated shadowing. Even
more surprisingly, the identical performance of RSS and DRSS-
based LVSs is found to hold even when the adversary does not
optimize his true location. Only in the case where the adversary
does not optimize all variables under her control, do we find the
performance of an RSS-based LVS to be better than a DRSS-
based LVS. The results reported here are important for a wide
range of emerging wireless communication applications whose
proper functioning depends on the authenticity of the location
information reported by a transceiver.
Index Terms—Location verification, wireless networks, Re-
ceived Signal Strength (RSS), Differential Received Signal
Strength (DRSS), spatially correlated shadowing.
I. INTRODUCTION
As location information becomes of growing importance in
wireless networks, procedures to formally authenticate (verify)
that information has attracted considerable research interest
[1–10]. In a wide range of emerging wireless networks, the
system may request a device (user) to report a location
obtained through some independent means (e.g., via a Global
Positioning System (GPS) receiver embedded in the device).
Such location information can be used to empower some
functionality of the wireless network such as in geographic
routing protocols (e.g., [11–13]), to provide for location-
based access control protocols (e.g., [14, 15]) or to provide
some new location-based services (e.g., location-based key
generation [16]). However, the use of location information
as an enabler of functionality or services within the wireless
network, also provides ample opportunity to attack the system
since any reported location information (such as GPS) can
be easily spoofed. Such potential attacks are perhaps most
concerning in the context of emerging Intelligent Transport
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Systems (ITS) such as wireless vehicular networks, where
spoofed positions may lead to catastrophic results for vehicular
collision-avoidance systems [18].
In this work, we focus on a formal analysis of LVSs that
attempt to verify a user’s claimed location (such as a GPS
location) based on independent observations received by the
the wireless communications network itself. The inference in
such an LVS is carried out to determine whether the claimed
location represents a legitimate user (a user who reports/claims
to the network a location consistent with his true position) or
a malicious user (a user who reports to the network a location
inconsistent with his true position). A key difference between
an LVS and a localization system is that the output of an
LVS is a binary decision (legitimate/malicious user), whereas
in localization system the output is an estimated location e.g.,
[19–21]. As such, an LVS is provided with some additional
a priori (but potentially false) location information (i.e., a
claimed location).
Since the RSS measured by wireless network is easily
obtained, many location verification algorithms that utilize
RSS as input observations have been developed (e.g., [3, 5, 6,
9, 10]). In addition, RSS can be readily combined with other
location information metrics in order to improve the perfor-
mance of a localization system [22, 23]. However, shadowing
is one of the most influential factors in RSS-based LVSs, and
all existing studies in RSS-based LVSs have made a simplified
but unrealistic assumption that the shadowing at two different
locations is uncorrelated. As per many empirical studies, the
shadowing at different locations will be significantly correlated
when the locations are close to each other or different locations
possess similar terrain configurations e.g., [24–26]. Although
some specific studies have investigated the performance of
RSS-based localization systems under correlated shadowing
[27–29], the impact of spatially correlated shadowing on
RSS-based LVSs under realistic threat models has not been
previously explored. This leaves an important gap in our
understanding on the performance levels of RSS-based LVSs
in realistic wireless channel settings and under realistic threat
models. The main purpose of this paper is to close this gap.
Further to our considerations of RSS-based LVSs, we note
that there could be circumstances when use of Differential
Received Signal Strength (DRSS) in the LVS context may
be beneficial. Indeed it is well known that there are a range
of scenarios in which the use of DRSS is more suitable for
wireless location acquisition [30]. One example is where users
do not have a common transmit power setting on all devices.
However, the performance of DRSS-based LVSs have not yet
been analyzed in the literature. This work also closes this gap,
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shadowing regime. This will allow us to provide a detailed per-
formance comparison between RSS-based LVSs and DRSS-
based LVSs under correlated shadowing - a comparison that
provides for a few surprising results.
A summary of the main contributions of this work are as
follows. (i) Under spatially correlated log-normal shadowing,
we analyze the detection performance of an RSS-based LVS
in terms of false positive and detection rates. Our analysis
demonstrates that the spatial correlation of the shadowing
leads to a significant performance improvement for the RSS-
based LVS relative to the case with uncorrelated shadowing
(a doubling of the detection rate for a given false positive
rate for anticipated correlation levels). (ii) We analyze the
detection performance of a DRSS-based LVS under spatially
correlated shadowing, proving that the detection performance
of the DRSS-based LVS is identical to that of the RSS-based
LVS. As we discuss later, this result is rather surprising. (iii)
We analyze our systems under a relaxed threat model scenario
in which the adversary whose actual location is physically
constrained (e.g., constrained within a building) and therefore
cannot optimize his location for the attack. We show that
even in these circumstance the performance of the RSS-based
LVS and the DRSS-based LVS remain identical. (iv) Finally,
we illustrate the case where the RSS-based LVS do have
advantages over the DRSS-Based LVS, namely, when the
adversary does not (or cannot) optimize his boosted transmit
power level.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II details our system model. In Section III, the detection
performance of an RSS-based LVS is analyzed under spatially
correlated shadowing. In Section IV, the detection perfor-
mance of a DRSS-based LVS is analyzed, and a throughout
performance comparison between the RSS-based LVS and the
DRSS-based LVS is provided. Section V provides numerical
results to verify the accuracy of our analysis. Finally, Section
VI draws concluding remarks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Assumptions
We outline the system model and state the assumptions
adopted in this work.
1) A single user (legitimate or malicious) reports his
claimed location, xc = [x1c , x2c ] ∈ R2, to a network with
N Base Stations (BSs) in the communication range of
the user, where the publicly known location of the i-th
BS is xi = [x1i , x2i ] ∈ R2 (i = 1, 2, . . . , N ). One of the
N BSs is the Process Center (PC), and all other BSs
will transmit the measurements collected from the user
to the PC. The PC is to make decisions based on the
user’s claimed location and the measurements collected
by all the N BSs.
2) A user (legitimate or malicious) can obtain his true
position, xt = [x1t , x2t ], from his localization equipment
(e.g., GPS), and that the localization error is zero. Thus,
a legitimate user’s claimed location, xc, is exactly the
same as his true location. However, a malicious user will
falsify (spoof) his claimed position in an attempt to fool
the LVS. We assume the spoofed claimed location of the
malicious user is also xc.
3) We adopt the minimum distance model as our threat
model, in which the distance between the malicious
user’s true location and his claimed location is greater
or equal to r, i.e., |xc − xt| ≥ r.
4) We denote the null hypothesis where the user is legiti-
mate as H0, and denote the alternative hypothesis where
the user is malicious as H1. The a priori knowledge at
the LVS can be summarized as{
H0 : xc = xt (legitimate user)
H1 : |xc − xt| ≥ r (malicious user).
(1)
B. Observation Model under H0 (legitimate user)
Based on the log-normal propagation model, the RSS (in
dB) received by the i-th BS from a legitimate user, yi, is
given by
yi = ui + ωi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (2)
where
ui = p− 10γ log10
(
dci
d
)
, (3)
and p is a reference received power corresponding to a
reference distance d, γ is the path loss exponent, ωi is a
zero-mean normal random variable with variance σ2dB , and
dci is the Euclidean distance from the i-th BS to the legitimate
user’s claimed location (also his true location) given by
dci = |xc − xi|. In practice, in order to determine the values
of a pair of p and d we have to know the transmit power of
a legitimate user. Under spatially correlated shadowing, ωi is
correlated to ωj (j = 1, 2, . . . , N ), and the N ×N covariance
matrix of σ = [σ1, . . . , ωN ]T is denoted as R. Adopting the
well-known spatially correlated shadowing model of [7, 24],
the (i, j)-th element of R is given by
Rij = σ
2
dB exp
(
−
dij
Dc
ln 2
)
, j = 1, 2, . . . , N, (4)
where dij = ||xi−xj||2 is the Euclidean distance from the i-th
BS to the j-th BS, and Dc is a constant in units of distance,
at which the correlation coefficient reduces to 1/2 (in this
work all distances are in meters). From (4), we can see that
the correlation between ωi and ωj decreases as dij increases
(Rij = σ2dB when i = j, and Rij → 0 as dij →∞). We also
note that Rij increases as Dc increases for a given dij . As
such, Dc is a parameter that indicates the degree of shadowing
correlation in some specific environment (for a given dij , a
larger Dc means that the shadowing is more correlated).
Based on (2), we can see that under H0 the N -dimensional
observation vector y = [y1, . . . , yN ]T follows a multivariate
normal distribution, which is
f (y|H0) = N (u,R) , (5)
where u = [u1, u2, . . . , uN ]T is the mean vector.
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In practice, in addition to spoofing the claimed location, the
malicious user can also adjust his transmit power to impact
the RSS values received by all BSs in order to minimize the
probability of being detected. As such, the RSS received by
the i-th BS from a malicious user, yi, is given by
yi = px + vi + ωi, (6)
where
vi = p− 10γ log10
(
dti
d
)
, (7)
dti is the Euclidean distance from the i-th BS to the malicious
user’s true location given by dti = ||xt − xi||2, and px is the
additional boosted transmit power. Based on (6), under H1 the
N -dimensional observation vector y, conditioned on known px
and xt, also follows a multivariate normal distribution, which
is
f (y|px,xt,H1) = N (px1N + v,R) , (8)
where 1N is a N ×1 vector with all elements set to unity and
v = [v1, v2, . . . , vN ]
T
. We note that in practice px and xt are
set by the malicious user.
D. Decision Rule of an LVS
We adopt the Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) as the decision
rule since it is known that the LRT achieves the highest
detection rate for any given false positive rate [31]. Therefore,
the LRT can achieve the minimum Bayesain average cost
and the maximum mutual information between the input and
output of an LVS [10]. The LRT decision rule is given by
Λ (ψ(y)) ,
f (ψ(y)|H1)
f (ψ(y)|H0)
H1
≥
<
H0
λ, (9)
where Λ (ψ(y)) is the test statistic, ψ(y) is a predefined
transformation of the observations y (to be determined in a
specific LVS, e.g., RSS or DRSS), f (ψ(y)|H1) is the marginal
likelihood (probability density function of ψ(y)) under H1,
f (ψ(y)|H0) is the marginal likelihood under H0, λ is the
threshold corresponding to Λ (ψ(y)), H0 and H1 are the
binary decisions that infer whether the user is legitimate or
malicious, respectively. Given the decision rule in (9), the
false positive and detection rates of an LVS are functions of
λ. The specific value of λ can be set through minimizing the
Bayesian average cost or maximizing the mutual information
between the system input and output in the information-
theoretic framework. The intrinsic core performance metrics
of an LVS are false positive and detection rates, other potential
performance metrics can be written as functions of these two
rates. As such, in this work we adopt the false positive and
detection rates as the performance metrics for an LVS.
III. RSS-BASED LOCATION VERIFICATION SYSTEM
In this section, we analyze the performance of the RSS-
based LVS in terms of the false positive and detection rates,
based on which we examine the impact of the spatially
correlated shadowing.
A. Attack Strategy of the Malicious User
We assume that the malicious user optimizes all the pa-
rameters under his control. This assumption is adopted in
most threat models. The malicious user will therefore optimize
his px and xt such that the difference between f (y|H0)
and f (y|px,xt,H1) is minimized in order to minimize the
probability to be detected. Here, we adopt the Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence to quantify the difference between
f (y|H0) and f (y|px,xt,H1), which is a measure of the
information loss when f (y|px,xt,H1) is used to approximate
f (y|H0) [32].
Based on (5) and (8), the KL divergence between f (y|H0)
and f (y|px,xt,H1) is given by
φ(px,xt) = DKL [f (y|H0) ||f (y|px,xtH1)]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
ln
f (y|H0)
f (y|px,xt,H1)
f (y|H0) dy
=
1
2
(px1N + v − u)
TR−1(px1N + v − u).
(10)
Then, the optimal values of px and xt that minimize φ(px,xt)
can be obtained through
(p∗x,x
∗
t ) = argmin
px,||xt−xc||2≥r
φ(px,xt). (11)
The closed-form expressions for p∗x and x∗t are intractable,
but they can be obtained through numerical search. In order
to simplify the numerical search, we first derive the optimal
value of px for a given xt, which is presented in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1: The optimal value of px that minimizes
φ(px,xt) for any given xt is
pox(xt) =
(u− v)TR−11N
1TNR
−11N
. (12)
Proof: The first derivative of φ(px,xt) with respect to px
is derived as
∂φ(px,xt)
∂px
=
∂φ(px,xt)
∂ (px1N )
∂ (px1N )
∂px
= (px1N + v − u)
TR−1
∂ (px1N )
∂px
= (px1N + v − u)
TR−11N .
(13)
Following (13), the second derivative of φ(px,xt) with respect
to px is derived as
∂2φ(px,xt)
∂2px
= 1TNR
−11N . (14)
Since R is a positive-definite symmetric matrix, as per (14) we
have ∂2φ(px,xt)/∂2px > 0, which indicates that φ(px,xt) is
a convex function of px. As such, setting ∂φ(px,xt)/∂px =
0, we obtain the desired result in (12) after some algebraic
manipulations.
From Lemma 1, we note that the malicious user optimizes
his transmit power, i.e., px = pox(xt), to compensate the
path-loss difference between his claimed location and his
true location. We also note that pox(xt) is a function of R
under spatial correlated shadowing. This is different from
the scenario with uncorrelated shadowing, where pox(xt) is
4independent of the shadowing noise [10]. Substituting pox(xt)
into (10), we have
φ(pox(xt),xt) =
1
2
(w − u)TR−1(w − u), (15)
where
w =
(u− v)TR−11N
1TNR
−11N
1N + v. (16)
Since we have shown that φ(px,xt) is a convex function of
px in (14), x∗t is given by
x∗t = argmin
||xt−xc||2≥r
φ(pox(xt),xt). (17)
Substituting x∗t into pox(xt), we obtain p∗x = pox(x∗t ). We
note that Lemma 1 is of importance since it reduces a three-
dimension numerical search in (11) into a two-dimension
numerical search in (17).
Substituting p∗x and x∗t into (6), the RSS received by the
i-th BS from a malicious user can be written as
y = w∗ + ω, (18)
where
w∗ =
(u− v∗)TR−11N
1TNR
−11N
1N + v∗, (19)
v∗ is obtained by substituting x∗t into v, and
ω = [ω1, ω2, . . . , ωN ]. Based on (18), the likelihood
function under H1 conditioned on p∗x and x∗t can be written
as
f (y|p∗x,x
∗
t ,H1) = N (w
∗,R). (20)
B. Performance of the RSS-based LVS
In some practical cases, the malicious user may not have
the freedom to optimize his true location, e.g., if the malicious
user is physically limited to be inside a building. However,
the malicious user can still optimize his transmit power as
per his true location. As such, without losing generality, we
first analyze the performance of the RSS-based LVS for px =
pox(xt), and then present the performance of the RSS-based
LVS for px = p∗x and xt = x∗t as a special case.
Following (9), the specific LRT decision rule of the RSS-
based LVS for px = pox(xt) is given by
Λo (y) ,
f (y|pox(xt),xt,H1)
f (y|H0)
H1
≥
<
H0
λoR, (21)
where Λo (y) is the likelihood ratio of y for px = pox(xt),
f (y|pox(xt),xt,H1) = N (w,R), and λoR is a threshold for
Λo (y). Substituting (5) and (20) into (21), we obtain Λo (y)
in the log domain as
ln Λo (y)=
1
2
(y−u)TR−1(y−u)−
1
2
(y−w)TR−1(y−w)
= (w−u)T R−1y−
1
2
(w−u)T R−1 (w+u) .
As such, for the theorem to follow, we can rewrite the decision
rule in (21) as the following format
T(y)
H1
≥
<
H0
ΓR, (22)
where T(y) is the test statistic given by
T(y) , (w − u)T R−1y, (23)
and ΓR is the threshold for T(y) given by
ΓR , lnλ
o
R +
1
2
(w − u)T R−1 (w + u) . (24)
We then derive the false positive rate, αoR, and detection rate,
βoR, of the RSS-based LVS for px = pox(xt) in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: For px = pox(xt), the false positive and detec-
tion rates of the RSS-based LVS are
αoR(xt) = Q

 ΓR − (w−u)T R−1u√
(w−u)T R−1 (w−u)


= Q

 lnλoR + 12 (w−u)T R−1 (w−u)√
(w−u)T R−1 (w−u)

 , (25)
βoR(xt) = Q

 ΓR − (w−u)T R−1w√
(w−u)T R−1 (w−u)


= Q

 lnλoR − 12 (w−u)T R−1 (w−u)√
(w−u)T R−1 (w−u)

 , (26)
where Q[x] = 1√
2pi
∫∞
x
exp(−t2/2)dt.
Proof: Using (23), the distributions of T(y) under H0
and H1 are derived as follows
T(y)|H0
∼ N
(
(w−u)T R−1u, (w−u)T R−1R
(
(w−u)T R−1
)T)
= N
(
(w−u)T R−1u, (w−u)T R−1 (w−u)
)
, (27)
T(y)|H1
∼ N
(
(w−u)T R−1w, (w−u)T R−1R
(
(w−u)T R−1
)T)
= N
(
(w−u)T R−1w, (w−u)T R−1 (w−u)
)
. (28)
As per the decision rule in (22), the false positive and detection
rates are given by
αoR(xt) , Pr (T(y) ≥ ΓR|H0) , (29)
βoR(xt) , Pr (T(y) ≥ ΓR|H1) . (30)
Substituting (27) and (28) into (29) and (30), respectively,
we obtain the results in (32) and (33) after some algebraic
manipulations.
For px = p∗x and xt = x∗t , the LRT decision rule of the
RSS-based LVS is given by
Λ∗ (y) ,
f (y|p∗x,x
∗
t ,H1)
f (y|H0)
H1
≥
<
H0
λ∗R, (31)
where Λ∗ (y) is the likelihood ratio of y for px = p∗x and xt =
x∗t and λ∗R is a threshold for Λ∗ (y). Following Theorem 1,
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for px = p∗x and xt = x∗t are given by
α∗R = Q

 lnλ∗R + 12 (w∗−u)T R−1 (w∗−u)√
(w∗−u)T R−1 (w∗−u)

 , (32)
β∗R = Q

 lnλ∗R − 12 (w∗−u)T R−1 (w∗−u)√
(w∗−u)T R−1 (w∗−u)

 . (33)
We note that the results provided in (25) and (26) are based
on an arbitrary true location xt of the malicious user, which
are more general than that provided in (32) and (33). That is,
α∗R = α
o
R(x
∗
t ) and β∗R = βoR(x∗t ). By using (25) and (26), we
can compare the performance of the RSS-based LVS with that
of the DRSS-based LVS in a general scenario.
IV. DRSS-BASED LOCATION VERIFICATION SYSTEM
In this section, we analyze the detection performance of the
DRSS-based LVS under spatially correlated shadowing. We
also provide an analytical comparison between the RSS-based
LVS and the DRSS-based LVS.
A. DRSS Observations
We obtain (N − 1) basic DRSS observations from N RSS
observations by subtracting the N -th RSS observation from
all other (N − 1) RSS observations. As such, the m-th DRSS
value under H0 is given by
∆ym = ∆um +∆ωm, m = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, (34)
where ∆um = um−uN , and ∆ωm = ωm−ωN . We note that
∆ωm is Gaussian with zero mean and variance 2(σ2dB−RmN).
We denote the (N − 1) × (N − 1) covariance matrix of the
(N−1)-dimensional DRSS vector∆y = [∆y1, . . . ,∆yN−1]T
as D, whose (m,n)-th element is given by (n = 1, 2, . . . , N−
1)
Dmn = RNN +Rmn −RmN −RnN . (35)
As such, ∆y under H0 follows a multivariate normal distri-
bution, which is given by
f (∆y|H0) = N (∆u,D), (36)
where ∆u = [∆u1, . . . ,∆uN−1]T is the mean vector.
Likewise, the m-th DRSS value under H1 is
∆ym = ∆vm +∆ωm, (37)
where ∆vm = vm − vN . Noting ∆v = [∆v1, . . . ,∆vN−1]T ,
∆y underH1 follows another multivariate normal distribution,
which is given by
f (∆y|xt,H1) = N (∆v,D). (38)
B. Attack Strategy of the Malicious User
As per (3) and (7), we know that both p and d are constant
at all elements of u and v. As such, based on (34) and (37) we
can see that ∆y under both H0 and H1 are independent of p
and d, and therefore both f (∆y|H0) and f (∆y|xt,H1) are
independent of p and d. Therefore, in the DRSS-based LVS
the malicious user does not need to adjust his transmit power
in order to minimize the probability to be detected. In the
DRSS-based LVS, the malicious user only has to optimize his
true location through minimizing the KL-divergence between
f (∆y|H0) and f (∆y|xt,H1), which is given by
ϕ(xt) = DKL [f (∆y|H0) ||f (∆y|xt,H1)]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
ln
f (∆y|H0)
f (∆y|xt,H1)
f (∆y|H0) d∆y
=
1
2
(∆v −∆u)TD−1(∆v −∆u).
(39)
The optimal value of xt for the malicious user in the DRSS-
based LVS can be obtained through
x
†
t = argmin
||xt−xc||2≥r
ϕ(xt). (40)
The likelihood function under H1 for xt = x†t is given by
f
(
∆y|x†t ,H1
)
= N (∆v†,D), (41)
where ∆v†m = v†m− v
†
N and v† is obtained by substituting x
†
t
into v.
C. Performance of the DRSS-based LVS
In this subsection, we again consider the case where the
true location of the malicious user is physically constrained.
Specifically, we first analyze the performance of the DRSS-
based LVS for an arbitrary xt, and then present the perfor-
mance of the DRSS-based LVS for xt = x†t as a special case
in this subsection.
Following (9), the specific LRT decision rule of the DRSS-
based LVS for any xt is given by
Λ (∆y) ,
f (∆y|xt,H1)
f (∆y|H0)
H1
≥
<
H0
λD, (42)
where Λ (∆y) is the likelihood ratio of ∆y and λD is a
threshold for Λ (∆y). Substituting (36) and (41) into (52),
we obtain Λ (∆y) in log domain as
ln Λ (∆y) =
1
2
(∆y −∆u)TD−1(∆y −∆u)
−
1
2
(∆y −∆v)TD−1(∆y −∆v)
= (∆v −∆u)TD−1∆y
−
1
2
(∆v −∆u)TD−1(∆v +∆u).
Then, we can rewrite the decision rule given in (52) as
T(∆y)
H0
≥
<
H1
ΓD, (43)
6where T(∆y) is the test statistic given by
T(∆y) , (∆v −∆u)TD−1∆y, (44)
and ΓD is the threshold for T(∆y) given by
ΓD , lnλD +
1
2
(∆v −∆u)TD−1(∆v +∆u). (45)
We then derive the false positive rate, αD(xt), and the
detection rate, βD(xt), of the DRSS-based LVS for any xt
in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The false positive and detection rates of the
DRSS-based LVS for any xt are given by
αD(xt) = Q

 ΓD − (∆v−∆u)T D−1∆u√
(∆v−∆u)T D−1 (∆v−∆u)


= Q

 lnλD + 12 (∆v−∆u)T D−1 (∆v−∆u)√
(∆v−∆u)T D−1 (∆v−∆u)

 ,
(46)
βD(xt) = Q

 ΓD − (∆v−∆u)T D−1∆v√
(∆v−∆u)T D−1 (∆v−∆u)


= Q

 lnλD − 12 (∆v−∆u)T D−1 (∆v−∆u)√
(∆v−∆u)T D−1 (∆v−∆u)

 .
(47)
Proof: Using (36), (41), and (44), the distributions of
T(∆y) under H0 and H1 are derived as follows
T(∆y)|H0
∼N
(
(∆v−∆u)T D−1∆u, (∆v−∆u)T D−1 (∆v−∆u)
)
, (48)
T(∆y)|H1
∼N
(
(∆v−∆u)TD−1∆v, (∆v−∆u)T D−1 (∆v−∆u)
)
. (49)
As per the decision rule in (43), the false positive and
detection rates are given by
αD(xt) , Pr (T(∆y) ≥ ΓD|H0) , (50)
βD(xt) , Pr (T(∆y) ≥ ΓD|H1) . (51)
Substituting (48) and (49) into (50) and (51), respectively,
we obtain the results in (53) and (54) after some algebraic
manipulations.
For xt = x†t , the LRT decision rule of the DRSS-based LVS
is given by
Λ∗ (∆y) ,
f (∆y|xt,H1)
f (∆y|H0)
H1
≥
<
H0
λ∗D, (52)
where Λ∗ (∆y) is the likelihood ratio of ∆y for xt = x†t
and λ∗D is a threshold for Λ∗ (∆y). Following Theorem 2,
the false positive and detection rates of the DRSS-based LVS
for xt = x†t are given by
α∗D = Q

 lnλ
∗
D +
1
2
(
∆v†−∆u
)T
D−1
(
∆v†−∆u
)
√(
∆v†−∆u
)T
D−1
(
∆v†−∆u
)

 ,
(53)
β∗D = Q

 lnλ
∗
D −
1
2
(
∆v†−∆u
)T
D−1
(
∆v†−∆u
)
√(
∆v†−∆u
)T
D−1
(
∆v†−∆u
)

 .
(54)
Again, note that the results provided in (46) and (47) are for
any xt, which are more general than that provided in (53) and
(54). That is, α∗D = αD(x†t ) and β∗D = βD(x†t ). By using (46)
and (47), we can compare the performance of the DRSS-based
LVS with that of the RSS-based LVS in a general scenario.
D. Comparison between the RSS-based LVS and the DRSS-
based LVS
We now present the following theorem with regard to the
comparison between the RSS-based LVS and the DRSS-based
LVS.
Theorem 3: For any xt, we have αoR(xt) = αD(xt) and
βoR(xt) = βD(xt) for λR = λD. That is, for any xt the
performance of the RSS-based LVS with px = pox(xt) is
identical to the performance of the DRSS-based LVS.
Proof: Based on (25), (26), (46), and (47), we can see that
αoR(xt), β
o
R(xt), αD(xt), and βD(xt) are all in the form of a
Q function. We denote αoR(xt) = Q(ζoR), βoR(xt) = Q(ηoR),
αD(xt) = Q(ζD), and βD(xt) = Q(ηD). In order to prove
αoR(xt) = αD(xt) and βoR(xt) = βD(xt) for λR = λD, we
only need to prove ζoR − ηoR = ζD − ηD . As per (25), (26),
(46), and (47), in order to prove ζoR− ηoR = ζD − ηD (such as
to prove Theorem 3) we have to prove the following equation
(w−u)T R−1 (w−u) = (∆v−∆u)T D−1 (∆v−∆u) . (55)
Based on the singular value decomposition (SVD) of R, we
can transform the RSS observation vector y into another
observation vector y′ by rotating and scaling1. We can then
obtain the DRSS observations from y′ instead of y. The
transformation from y to y′ is unique since the singular values
of R are unique. In addition, y follows a multivariate normal
distribution. As such, the transformation from y to y′ keeps
all the properties of y in y′, which means the performance of
an LVS based on y is identical to the performance of an LVS
based on y′ [33, 34]. Therefore, in order to prove Theorem 3
we only have to prove (55) for R = IN . Denoting g = v−u,
we have ∆vm −∆um = gm − gN . Substituting R = IN into
w given in (16), we obtain
w − u = g−
gTR−11N
1TNR
−11N
1N = g−

 1
N
N∑
j=1
gj

1N .
1The covariance matrix R is a real positive-definite symmetric matrix, and
thus the SVD of R can be written as R = SR′ST . As such, y′ is given by
y′ = R′
1
2 Sy and the covariance matrix of y′ will be IN .
7With regard to the left side of (55), for R = IN we have
(w−u)T R−1 (w−u) =
N∑
i=1

gi − 1
N
N∑
j=1
gj


2
=
N∑
i=1

g2i − 2N gi
N∑
j=1
gj +
1
N2

 N∑
j=1
gj


2


=

 N∑
i=1
g2i −
2
N
(
N∑
i=1
gi
) N∑
j=1
gj

+ 1
N

 N∑
j=1
gj


2


=

 N∑
i=1
g2i −
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
gi
)2 . (56)
As per the definition of D given in (35), for R = IN we have
D = IN−1 + 1(N−1)×(N−1), (57)
where 1(N−1)×(N−1)) is the (N−1)×(N−1) matrix with all
elements set to unity. Then, based on the Sherman-Morrison
formula [35], we have
D−1 =
[
IN−1 + 1(N−1)×(N−1)
]−1
=
[
IN−1 + 1(N−1) × 1
T
(N−1)
]−1
=
[
I−1N−1 −
I−1N−11(N−1)×(N−1)I
−1
N−1
1 + 1T(N−1)I
−1
N−11(N−1)
]
=
[
IN−1 −
1(N−1)×(N−1)
N
]
. (58)
Substituting (58) into the right side of (55), we have
(∆v−∆u)T D−1 (∆v−∆u)
=(∆v−∆u)T
[
IN−1−
1(N−1)×(N−1)
N
]
(∆v−∆u)
=(∆v−∆u)T IN−1 (∆v−∆u)
−
1
N
(∆v−∆u)T 1(N−1) × 1
T
(N−1) (∆v−∆u)
=
N−1∑
i=1
(gi − gN)
2 −
1
N
[
N−1∑
i=1
(gi − gN)
]2
=
N∑
i=1
(gi − gN)
2 −
1
N
[
N∑
i=1
(gi − gN )
]2
=
N∑
i=1
(gi − gN)
2−
1
N
N∑
i=1
(gi − gN)

 N∑
j=1
(gj − gN )


=

 N∑
i=1
g2i −
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
gi
)2 . (59)
Comparing (56) with (59), we can see that we have proved
(55) for R = IN . This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
We note that the result provided in Theorem 3 is valid
for any R, i.e., for any kind of shadowing (correlated or
uncorrelated). We also note that in Theorem 3 the condition
to guarantee the RSS-based LVS being identical to the DRSS-
based LVS is that px = pox(xt). This condition forces the
malicious user to optimize his transmit power based on the
given xt in the RSS-based LVS, but not in the DRSS-based
LVS. Without this condition, the comparison result between
the RSS-based LVS and the DRSS-based LVS is present in
the following corollary.
Corollary 1: For any xt, the performance of the RSS-based
LVS with px 6= pox(xt) is better than the performance of the
DRSS-based LVS.
Proof: For any px and xt, the LRT decision rule of the
RSS-based LVS is given by
Λ (y) ,
f (y|px,xt,H1)
f (y|H0)
H1
≥
<
H0
λR, (60)
where Λ (y) is the likelihood ratio of y and λR is a threshold
for Λ (y). Following Theorem 1, the false positive and detec-
tion rates of the RSS-based LVS for any px and xt are given
by
αR(px,xt) = Q

 lnλR + 12 (v−u)T R−1 (v−u)√
(v−u)T R−1 (v−u)

 , (61)
βR(px,xt) = Q

 lnλR − 12 (v−u)T R−1 (v−u)√
(v−u)T R−1 (v−u)

 . (62)
Then, Corollary 1 can be presented in math as that given
px 6= p
o
x(xt), we have βR(px,xt) > βD(xt) for αR(px,xt) =
αD(xt) or αR(px,xt) < αD(xt) for βR(px,xt) = βD(xt).
Given the proof of Theorem 3, in order to prove Corollary 1
we only have to prove the following equation
(v−u)T R−1 (v−u) > (∆v−∆u)T D−1 (∆v−∆u) . (63)
Following similar manipulations in (56), for R = IN we have
(v−u)T R−1 (v−u) =
N∑
i=1
g2i . (64)
Since the malicious user’s true location cannot be the same
as his claimed location, i.e., xt 6= xc, we have v 6= u and(∑N
i=1 gi
)2
> 0. As such, as per (56) and (64) we have
(v−u)T R−1 (v−u) > (w−u)T R−1 (w−u) . (65)
Based on (55) and (65), we have proved (63), which completes
the proof of Corollary 1.
We note that Corollary 1 presents a fair comparison between
the RSS-based LVS and the DRSS-based LVS when the
malicious user does not know the transmit power of the
legitimate user and thus cannot optimize his transmit power.
Under the best attack strategies of the malicious user, the
comparison result between the RSS-based LVS and the DRSS-
based LVS is present in the following corollary.
Corollary 2: We have α∗R = α∗D and β∗R = β∗D for λ∗R =
λ∗D. That is, the performance of the RSS-based LVS for px =
p∗x and xt = x∗t is identical to the performance of the DRSS-
based LVS for xt = x†t .
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Fig. 1. ROC curves of the RSS-based LVS for σdB = 7.5, Dc = 50m,
r = 500m, px = pox(xt), and N = 3
(
x1 = [−250, 10], x2 = [0,−10],
and x3 = [250, 10]
)
.
Proof: Based on Theorem 3, in order to prove Corollary 2
we only have to prove x∗t = x
†
t . We note that x∗t and x
†
t
are obtained through minimizing φ(pox(xt),xt) and ϕ(xt),
respectively. As such, in order to prove x∗t = x
†
t , it suffices to
prove φ(pox(xt),xt) = ϕ(xt). As per (15) and (39), we can
see that we have proved φ(pox(xt),xt) = ϕ(xt) in (55).
We note that Corollary 2 presents a comparison between
the performance limits of the RSS-based LVS and the DRSS-
based LVS. In the proof of Corollary 2, we also prove that
the malicious user’s optimal true locations for the RSS-based
LVS and the DRSS-based LVS are the same. We also note
that the analysis and results reported in this work are not
directly applicable to the colluding threat scenario (where
multiple colluding adversaries attack the LVS). Future studies
may wish to explore these more sophisticated attacks, in
the context of correlated fading channels. However, although
such sophisticated attacks will obviously lead to poorer LVS
performance, a conjecture is that the trends discovered here
with regard to the impact of correlated shadowing on LVS
performance will persist.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now present numerical results to verify the accuracy
of our provided analysis. We also provide some insights
on the impact of the spatially correlated shadowing on the
performance of the RSS-based LVS and the DRSS-based LVS.
Although we have simulated a wide range of system set-
tings, the associated settings for the results shown in this work
(unless otherwise stated) are as follows. In the simulations
specifically shown here, the BSs and the claimed locations are
deployed in a rectangular area 500m by 20m. The origin is
set at the center of the rectangular area, with the x-coordinate
taken along the length, and the y-coordinate taken along the
width. The claimed locations of both legitimate and malicious
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Fig. 2. ROC curves of the DRSS-based LVS for σdB = 5, Dc = 50m,
r = 100m, and N = 4
(
x1 = [201.4,−9.0], x2 = [−161.7, 9.3], x3 =
[−97.4, 1.2], and x4 = [91.5, 2.4]
)
.
users are set such as xc = [50, 5], which is also the true
location of the legitimate user. The locations of all BSs are
provided in the caption of each figure, and all BSs collect
measurements from the legitimate and malicious users. The
path loss exponent is set to γ = 3, and the reference power is
set to p = −10 dB at d = 1m.
In Fig. 1, we present the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curves of the RSS-based LVS. In order to obtain this
figure, we have set the BSs at regular intervals (250m) on
each side of the rectangular area. In this figure, we first observe
that the Monte Carlo simulations precisely match the theoretic
results, confirming our analysis in Theorem 1. We also observe
that the ROC curves for xt 6= x∗t dominate the ROC curve for
xt = x
∗
t . This observation indicates that if the malicious user
does not optimize his true location, it will be easier for the
RSS-based LVS to detect the malicious user. In summary, the
ROC curve for xt = x∗t (analysis presented in (32) and (33))
provides a lower bound for the performance of the RSS-based
LVS.
In Fig. 2, we present the ROC curves of the DRSS-
based LVS. In order to obtain this figure, we have deployed
the BSs randomly inside the rectangular area, which relates
to a scenario where authorized vehicles represent the BSs.
In this scenario the authorized vehicles already have their
locations authenticated, and they are used as anchor points in
authenticating the positions of yet-to-be authorized vehicles. In
this figure, we first observe that the Monte Carlo simulations
precisely match the theoretic results, confirming our analysis in
Theorem 2. We also observe that the ROC curves for xt 6= x†t
dominate the ROC curve for xt = x†t . Again, this observation
demonstrates the importance of optimally choosing the true
location for the malicious user. To conclude, the ROC curve
for xt = x†t (analysis presented in (53) and (54)) provides a
lower bound for the performance of the DRSS-based LVS.
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Fig. 3. ROC curves of the RSS-based LVS and the DRSS-based LVS for
σdB = 5, Dc = 50m, r = 100m, and N = 3
(
x1 = [0, 10], x2 =
[131.4,−9.3], and x3 = [20.6,−0.9]
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.
In Fig. 3, we present the ROC curves of the RSS-based LVS
and the DRSS-based LVS. In order to obtain this figure, we
have set one of the BSs at one side of the rectangular area and
deployed the other two BSs randomly inside the rectangular
area. This mimics the scenario in which only one fixed BS
is available and we have to conduct location verification with
the help of two already-authorized vehicles. In this figure, we
first observe that the RSS-based LVS for px = pox(xt) and
the DRSS-based LVS achieve identical performance (identical
ROC curves). This demonstrates that as long as the malicious
user optimizes his transmit power (as per his true location) the
RSS-based LVS is identical to the DRSS-based LVS, which
confirms the analytical comparison between the RSS-based
LVS and the DRSS-based LVS presented in Theorem 3. We
also observe that the ROC curves of the RSS-based LVS for
px 6= pox(xt) dominate the ROC curves of the DRSS-based
LVS. This observation confirms that if the malicious user does
not optimize his transmit power, the RSS-based LVS achieves
a better performance than the DRSS-based LVS, which is
provided in Corollary 1. This indicates that the RSS-based
LVS is subjectively better than the DRSS-based LVS since
the performance of the DRSS-based LVS is independent of
the malicious user’s transmit power and the determination of
the optimal transmit power for the malicious user is no longer
required in the DRSS-based LVS. In the simulations of Fig. 3,
we confirmed that the malicious user’s optimal true location
for the RSS-based LVS is the same as that for the DRSS-based
LVS, i.e., x∗t = x
†
t . As such, Fig. 3 also confirms our analysis
provided in Corollary 2.
In Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, we investigate the impact of the spatial
correlation of the shadowing on the performance of the RSS-
based LVS and the DRSS-based LVS, where Dc = 0m corre-
sponds to the case with uncorrelated shadowing. In Fig. 4, we
set px = p∗x and xt = x∗t for the RSS-based LVS. From (12)
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and (17), we can see that both p∗x and x∗t are dependent on the
spatial correlation of the shadowing (they are both functions of
Dc), and the exact values of p∗x and x∗t corresponding to each
Dc are also provided in Fig. 4. In this figure, we first observe
the ROC curve moves toward the upper left corner (i.e., the
area under the ROC curve increases) as Dc increases, which
shows that the performance of the RSS-based LVS becomes
better as Dc increases. This observation demonstrates that the
spatial correlation of the shadowing improves the detection
performance of the RSS-based LVS. We note that the above
performance improvement due to the spatial correlation of the
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shadowing is only achieved under the condition px = p∗x and
xt = x
∗
t . If the malicious user is physically limited at some
specific location xt and he optimizes his transmit power as per
xt, i.e., px = pox(xt), the spatial correlation of the shadowing
does not have a monotonic impact on the performance of the
RSS-based LVS. As per Theorem 3 and Corollary 2, the ROC
curves provided in Fig. 4 are also valid for the DRSS-based
LVS, in which we have to set xt = x†t . As such, we can
conclude that the spatial correlation of the shadowing also
improves the detection performance of the DRSS-based LVS.
Also, for a determined xt the spatial correlation does not have
a monotonic impact on the performance of the DRSS-based
LVS. For confirmation, we also provide the ROC curves for
the DRSS-based LVS in Fig. 5 under different settings. The
same conclusion on the impact of spatial correlation of the
shadowing can be drawn from Fig. 5.
In Fig. 6, we examine the impact of the parameter r on
the performance of both the RSS-based LVS and the DRSS-
based LVS. We note that r is the minimum distance between
the claimed location and the malicious user’s true location.
As such, the disc determined by xc and r can be interpreted
as the area protected by some physical boundaries. In Fig. 6,
we observe that the ROC curve moves toward the upper left
corner as r increases, which indicate that the malicious user
will be easier to detect if he is further away from his claimed
location. We also observe that the performance improvement
due to increasing r is not significant when r is larger than
some specific value (e.g., r > 250m).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work we have formally analyzed for the first time,
the performance of two important types of LVSs (RSS and
DRSS-based) in the regime of spatially correlated shadowing.
Our analysis illustrates that for anticipated levels of correlated
shadowing both types of LVSs will have much improved
performance. In addition, we formally proved that in fact a
DRSS-based LVS has identical performance to that of an RSS-
based LVS, for all levels of correlated shadowing. Even more
surprisingly, the identical performance of RSS and DRSS-
based LVSs was found to hold even when the adversary
cannot optimize his true location. We found the performance
of an RSS-based LVS to be better than a DRSS-based LVS
only in the case where the adversary cannot optimize all
variables under her control. The results presented here will be
important for a wide range of practical location authentication
systems deployed in support of emerging wireless network
applications.
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